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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Order from which this interlocutory appeal is taken was entered on June 1, 
2006. (R. 1180-1159). Plaintiffs filed their Petition for Permission to Appeal 
Interlocutory Order with the Supreme Court on June 16, 2006. The Court granted the 
Petition for Interlocutory Appeal on July 27, 2006. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court 
by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) because the appeal is one over which the Court of 
Appeals does not have original jurisdiction. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Appellees are Dissatisfied with Appellants5 Statement of the Issues. 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and because Appellees are 
dissatisfied with the statement of issues provided in Appellants' Brief, Appellee hereafter 
sets forth the Appellants' statement of issues and the reasons for Appellee's 
dissatisfaction with the same. 
A. Appellants' Statement of the Issues and Standard of Review. 
1. Where parties own real property as tenants in common and enter into a clear 
and unambiguous written agreement to sell the property and to distribute the proceeds 
from the sale in a specific amount to each co-tenant, and following the agreement, sell the 
property and divide the proceeds consistent with their agreement, may the court 
subsequently order that the share of the proceeds of one co-tenant be divided again, as if 
that share of the proceeds were still owned in common? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation of the contract and ensuing 
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legal determinations are questions of law, reviewed for correctness. Kimball v. Campbell, 
699P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985); Crowtherv. Carter, 767 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah App. 1989). 
2. Where the court finds that a written agreement between general and limited 
partners of a limited partnership clearly and unambiguously expresses that all partners 
agreed to be governed by the terms of the written agreement and that the agreement is a 
valid amendment to the limited partnership, did the trial court err in ruling that the 
agreement failed to modify the method of distribution of the partnership assets upon its 
termination? 
Standard of Review: The Trial court's interpretation of the contract and ensuing 
legal determinations are questions of law, reviewed for correctness. Kimball v. Campbell, 
699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985); Crowtherv. Carter, 161 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah App. 1989). 
B. Appellees' Dissatisfaction with Appellants' Statement of the Issues. 
Issue No. 1: Appellants' statement of the first issue presented by this appeal 
contains an inaccurate and erroneous statement of the factual circumstances presented at 
the trial of this action. Appellants refer to a 'clear and unambiguous agreement' but 
cannot cite to or produce any agreement which provides for sale of the 30 acre parcel and 
distribution of proceeds in specific amounts. Appellants fail to include in their statement 
the fact that the property in question is the 30 acre parcel which was originally acquired 
by Masazo Shiba ("Masazo") and Tosh Shiba ("Tosh") as tenants in common, each with 
an undivided 50% interest in such property, and which interest Tosh had held since prior 
to the creation of the Trusts or the Limited Partnership. Also, it is not clear from the 
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statement that Appellants challenge the trial court's factual finding that Tosh Shiba did 
not ever convey his 50% interest in Masazo's home and the surrounding property, or the 
trial court's corresponding legal conclusions that Masazo had no right to dictate the 
disposition of Tosh's interest in the 30 acre parcel through his Trust. (R. 1163,1JH17, 18) 
Therefore, as to the money deposited into the Fidelity Account from the proceeds 
of sale of the Masazo home and property, Tosh was never a tenant in common with Sok, 
and the clear and unambiguous Family Agreement did not provide for conveyance by 
Tosh of his personal interest in the Masazo home and property to the Partnership, or to 
Sok. 
Issue No. 2: The basis of Appellee's challenge to the Appellants' statement of 
issue no. 2 lies both in the inaccuracy of the statement of factual circumstances presented 
therein as well as in the inconsistency with the statement of issue no. 1 as to the absence 
of ambiguity, and with the argument raised by Appellants' Brief in support of such 
statement. The primary asset of the Shiba Family Farms Limited Partnership 
("Partnership") was the family farm, a tract of approximately 300 acres. (R. 1177, [^12). 
The Partnership also owned valuable water rights. (R. 1175, ^ fl8). On January 10, 1995, 
the farm land owned by the Partnership was sold, along with personal farming and 
irrigation equipment owned by Appellant Masakazu Shiba ("Sok") and Tosh. (Rl 172, 
1J33). On July 6, 1995, the Medical Clinic property was purchased by the following 
parties and in the following percentages of ownership: 
Limited Partnership 69.48% 
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The Masazo Trust 3% 
SokShiba 13.76% 
ToshShiba 13.76% 
(Rl 171, | 3 8). The Warranty Deed delivered in connection with the purchase of the 
Medical Clinic established title in the Medical Clinic to the purchasing parties in the same 
interests as they contributed to the purchase price. (Rl 171, |39). 
The Limited Partnership Agreement ("LP Agreement") provided that on an annual 
basis or at other times as determined by the general partners, the profits from the 
Partnership could be distributed to the partners "in accordance with their respective 
capital contributions" and in the event of dissolution of the Partnership, the general 
partners were to wind up the affairs of the Partnership and "distribute undivided interests 
in partnership property to the partners in kind in proportion to their capital accounts at the 
time of distribution." (Exh. 8) (R. 1177, ffi[9, 10). 
Despite Appellants' attempt to characterize their appeal as an appeal of the trial 
court's interpretation of the contract, the issue presented for appeal in issue no.2 is, in 
actuality, a challenge to the trial court's underlying determination of facts. Therefore, 
Appellants' statement of the standard of review as pertains to issue no. 2 is incorrect. In 
light of the fact that Appellants ask this Court to examine factual issues and 
determinations, the standard of review of such findings should proceed under the more 
deferential "clearly erroneous" standard. Gallegos ex rel Rynes v. Dick Simon Trucking, 
Inc. 110 P.3d 710 (Utah App. 2004). 
Under this standard, a trial court's findings will not be set aside unless clearly 
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erroneous. "In order to establish that a particular finding of fact is clearly erroneous, 
'[a]n appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate 
that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 
against the clear weight of the evidence.' If the evidence is inadequately marshaled, this 
court assumes that all findings are adequately supported by the evidence." Chen v. 
Stewart. 2004 UT 82, ^19, 100 P.3d 1177, 1184). As to mixed questions of law and fact: 
The application of a legal standard ... involves varying degrees of 
discretion depending on the standard in question. If the application of the 
standard is extremely fact sensitive, then the reviewing court should 
generally give the trial court considerable discretion in determining 
whether the facts of a particular case come within the established rule of 
law. Even where the [appellants] purport to challenge only the legal 
ruling,... if a determination of the correctness of a court's application of a 
legal standard is extremely fact sensitive, the [appellants] also have a duty 
to marshal the evidence." Id. 
Appellants' statement of the standard for review is incorrect, as it incorrectly 
characterizes the question on appeal as strictly a legal question when it is a review of the 
trial court's findings of fact. As shown above, Appellees have completely failed to 
marshal the evidence. Therefore, the Court should assume that, in the Appellants' failure 
to marshal, all findings of fact (including mixed findings of fact and law) are adequately 
supported by the evidence. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order issued following the first phase of a 
bifurcated action for dissolution and accounting of a limited partnership, and for the 
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probate and distribution of the assets of a trust, which is a limited partner in the 
partnership. 
B. Court Proceedings and Disposition. 
Appellees hereby adopt the Appellants' Statement of the Case as to the "Course of 
proceedings and disposition below". (See Appellants' Brief, p. 3). 
C. Material Facts. 
Appellant Sok, and Appellees Tosh, Natsuye Shiba Nishijima ("Nats") and Seiji 
Shiba ("Seiji") are siblings and the children of Masazo and Riye Shiba ("Riye"), both of 
whom are deceased. (R. 1179, f 1). Beginning in the 1950s, Masazo, Tosh and Sok 
began to acquire farm ground in the area of Lehi, Utah and began to farm the land that 
was acquired. (R. 1179, %1). 
On May 25, 1959, Masazo and Tosh acquired by warranty deed approximately 100 
acres of ground from Robert Webb and Phyllis Webb. Under the Warranty Deed for the 
100 acres, Masazo and Tosh each held an undivided 50% interest as tenants in common. 
(Trial Exhibit 60; addendum Exhibit A). Included within such acreage was a parcel of 
approximately thirty acres upon which Masazo and Tosh each built homes (the "30 acre 
parcel"). (R. 1178, P ) . On December 31, 1985, Masazo acted as Trustor in executing 
the Masazo Shiba Marital and Family Trust (the "Masazo Trust"). On the same date, 
Riye Shiba acted as Trustor in executing the Riye Shiba Marital and Family Trust (the 
"Riye Trust"). Tosh and Sok were named as the Trustees of both the Masazo Trust and 
the Riye Trust. (Trial Exhibit 2; addendum Exhibit B) (R. 1178, f4). 
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On December 31, 1985, Masazo conveyed to the Masazo Trust, by Quit Claim 
Deed, all his right, title and interest in and to certain property including the 30 acre parcel 
with his home and the home of Tosh Shiba. (Trial Exhibit 62; addendum Exhibit C). 
However, Tosh did not convey his interest in the 30 acre parcel to the Masazo Trust. 
Tosh retained his interest in the 30 acre parcel, including the homes of Masazo and Tosh. 
(R. 1178, ^ 5). The Masazo Trust provided, among other things, that upon the death of 
Masazo, the interest of the Masazo Trust in the home Tosh built and resided in, together 
with a lot comprising approximately 1.49 acres should be distributed to Tosh or his heirs. 
(Exhibit 2,1f (6)(i)). (R. 1178, f6). The Masazo Trust also provided that upon the death 
of Masazo, the interest of the Masazo Trust in Masazo 5s primary residence, together with 
the lot on which it was built, was to be distributed to Sok or his heirs. (Trial Exhibit 2, 
paragraph (6)(ii)),(R. 1178,f7). 
On December 31, 1985, the Partnership was created by the execution and filing of 
the Articles of Limited Partnership of Shiba Family Farms. Sok and Tosh Shiba were 
named as general partners of the Partnership, and the following were named as limited 
partners: Masazo, Riye, Jean Shiba ("Jean"), Shizue Shiba ("Shizue"), Seiji, Delia Shiba 
("Delia"), Nats, and Ronald Nishijima ("Ron"). (Trial Exhibit 8; addendum Exhibit D) 
(R. 1178-77,1|8). 
Among other things, the LP Agreement provided that on an annual basis or at 
other times as determined by the general partners, the profits from the Partnership could 
be distributed to the partners "provided that all of the partners shall participate in any 
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such distribution pro rata in accordance with their respective capital contributions" (i.e., 
"in the ratio of [the partners'] share of the capitalization of the partnership)." (Exhibit 8, 
§§ 8.1 and 8.2) (R. 1177, f9). The LP Agreement also provided that in the event of the 
dissolution of the Partnership, the general partners (i.e., Sok and Tosh) were to wind up 
the affairs of the Partnership and could "elect to distribute undivided interests in 
partnership property to the partners in kind in proportion to their capital accounts at the 
time of distribution." (Exhibit 8, § 14.2) (R. 1177410). The LP Agreement could be 
amended only if the amendment was proposed in writing to the limited partners, and the 
consent of more than 51% of the ownership of the Partnership was given in writing, and 
in any event no amendment which reduced "the interest of any partner's capital, profits, 
and depreciation or sharing ratio"could be binding without the specific consent of each 
partner affected thereby. (Exhibit 8, § 15.8) (R. 1177,1fl 1). 
On December 31, 1985, Masazo and Riye conveyed to the Partnership farm land 
totaling approximately 300 acres. This was the principal asset of the Partnership. 
Following the conveyance of the farm land to the Partnership, Sok and Tosh operated the 
farm as general partners under an agreement to rent the farm land from the Partnership. 
(R. 1177,1|12). 
On or after December 31, 1985, the interests of Masazo and Riye Shiba in the 
Partnership were transferred by them to their respective trusts (R. 1176, ffi[13, 14). 
On December 4, 1990, Masazo executed the First Amendment to the Masazo Trust 
to provide that the interest in the Partnership owned by the Masazo Trust "shall be 
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distributed in such a way as to achieve a final percentage of ownership" of any interest 
held by the Masazo Trust in real property (including the 30 acre parcel but excluding the 
houses owned by Masazo and Tosh) among the children as follows: 
Masakazu (Sok) 43 14 % 
Seiji 6 XA % 
Natsuye (Nats) 6 !/2 % 
Toshiro (Tosh) 43 l/2 % 
The First Amendment to the Masazo Trust further directed the Trustees of the Masazo 
Trust to "make distribution out of the shares this trust owns in [the Partnership], or which 
it acquires by operation of my Last Will and Testament, to the above-named persons to 
achieve said final result through my estate and the estate of my spouse. (Trial Exhibit 3; 
addendum Exhibit E) (R. 1176, \\6). 
On December 27, 1990, Masazo executed the Second Amendment to the Masazo 
Trust to provide a specific legal description for Masazo's primary residence that would be 
distributed upon his death to Sok. The parcel described in the Second Amendment to the 
Masazo Trust was comprised of 1.372 acres. (Trial Exhibit 4; addendum Exhibit F) (R. 
1175-76,^117). 
Riye died on November 3, 1986. Upon her death, the interest in the Partnership 
held by the Riye Trust merged with the Masazo Trust. As of Riye's death, the Masazo 
Trust held a position as a limited partner in the Partnership equal to the combined 
interests initially held by Masazo and Riye in the Partnership, subject to any transfers of 
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interests to other partners that were made between December 31, 1985 and Riye's death. 
(R. 1175,H19). 
Prior to December 1994, Sok and Tosh became unable to effectively cooperate in 
the operation of the farm. This inability to cooperate also caused difficulty in the 
operation of the Partnership. (R. 1175, ^ j20). These difficulties led to the commencement 
of prior litigation involving the farm ground and the operation of the Partnership. As a 
result of the litigation, it was determined that the farm land should be sold. But the 
partners decided that because of the low basis in the farm land, a simple sale of the farm 
land would have incurred significant capital gains taxes. Therefore, the partners agreed 
that a Section 1031 "like kind" exchange of suitable property for the farm land which 
would be substituted into the Partnership to replace the farm land and avoid immediate 
capital gains taxes. (R. 1175, ^[21). 
The partners sought advice and counsel from a lawyer (David Jeffs) and from a 
CPA to guide them in a Section 1031 exchange. (R. 1175, [^22). 
On December 3, 1994, the family, including Masazo, met at Ron and Nat's house 
for a family meeting regarding Masazo's Trust, the Limited Partnership, Masazo's estate 
plan, and Section 1031 transactions. On the same date, all the individual members of the 
Partnership signed a family "Agreement" (the "Family Agreement") (Trial Exhibit 13; 
Appellants' Exhibit 1). On the same date, Masazo signed a document entitled "No 
Change Pledge to the Masazo Shiba Marital and Family Trust Agreement" ("No Change 
Pledge"). Each of the siblings and their spouses signed the No Pledge Agreement as 
10 
witnesses. (Trial Exhibit 14; Appellants' Exhibit 1) (R. 1174, !}23). The Family 
Agreement incorporated and specifically indicated an intent to be bound by four 
identified documents: (1) No Change Pledge (Trail Exhibit 14); (2) Exchanging 
Properties from the Farm Sale ("Exchanging Properties document") (Trail Exhibit 15; 
Appellants' Exhibit 1); (3) Pre-Allocation Plans A & B ("Pre-Allocation Plans") (part of 
Trail Exhibit 15); and (4) Present Ownership Schedule (part of Trial Exhibit 15) 
(collectively the "Family Agreement"). (R. 1174,^24). 
As part of the Family Agreement, Masazo pledged that he would not make any 
further changes to the Masazo Trust, so that all his heirs and the partners of the 
Partnership could rely on the inheritance they anticipated receiving from Masazo at his 
death. Masazo acknowledged that implementation of the plan of the Family Agreement 
would require him to amend the Masazo Trust and he agreed to cooperate by amending 
his trust to facilitate the exchanging of properties outlined in the Family Agreement. 
(Exhibit 14) (R. 1174, ^[25). However, Masazo never amended the Masazo Trust in the 
manner contemplated. (See Trial Exhibits 1 through 7; addendum Exhibits B, E, F - J). 
Although the fourth paragraph of the No Change Pledge purports to give 
beneficiaries of the trust the right to acquire replacement properties upon the sale of the 
farm using their anticipated trust inheritances, the same paragraph also contains the 
statement: "The pre-allocated amount and its earnings shall remain my [Masazo's] 
property until such time of distribution from my estate." (Trial Exhibit 14) (R. 1173, 
11f27-28). 
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The Family Agreement provided that the assets of the Partnership could be 
allocated to various children who would each locate a Section 1031 property to replace 
their designated share of the farm land owned by the Partnership. The intent of the 
Family Agreement was that the farm land was to be sold and, with the proceeds of sale, 
the replacement properties could be purchased. (R. 1173,^f29). Income or loss and 
management expenses for those replacement properties would be attributed to the partner 
who located and designated the replacement property. By replacing the Partnership 
property with the replacement properties, the sale of the farm land could qualify as a "like 
kind" exchange and avoid immediate liability for capital gains taxes from the sale with 
the basis in the farm land being transferred to the replacement properties, and the 
management of Partnership assets would be effectively divided among the partners. (R. 
1173,f29). 
The plan set forth in the Family Agreement was proposed by lawyer David Jeffs in 
a letter dated October 7, 1994. (Trail Exhibit 11; addendum Exhibit K). However, as set 
forth therein, Mr. Jeffs recognized and instructed that implementation of the plan would 
require modification of the LP Agreement to allow specific allocation of assets, income 
and expenses among the partners. (R. 1173, ^ 30). The LP Agreement was never 
modified to accomplish the proposed implementation of the plan. (Exhibit 8). 
Following the December 1994 meeting, the partners all began looking for 
exchange properties. Nats and Ron located a building lot in Farmington, Utah (the 
"Farmington Lot"); and Sok located a medical office building (the "Medical Clinic"). 
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The other partners were unsuccessflil in finding suitable replacement properties, although 
Tosh made numerous offers to purchase properties from various owners. (See e.g., Trial 
Exhibits 73, 86, 90, 91, 92, 95, 100, 111; addendum Exhibits L - S). (R. 1172,1J31). 
On January 10, 1995, the farm land was sold, along with some personal farming 
and irrigation equipment owned by Sok and Tosh in their individual capacities. The 
purchase price of the farm land was $1,952,868. The purchase price of the farming and 
irrigation equipment was $253,382, for a total purchase price of $2,206,250. (Trial 
Exhibit 76; addendum Exhibit T). The sale of the farm land triggered the need to 
designate replacement properties within the time required by the IRS for like kind 
exchanges. (R. 1172, f 33). At the time of the sale of the farm land, the Masazo Trust and 
Tosh also sold their interest in the 30 acre parcel, including the two residential lots and 
homes, to the purchaser of the farm land. (Trial Exhibits 69 and 70; addendum Exhibits 
U and V) (R. 1172, p 4 ) . The proceeds of the sale of Masazo's home and lot were 
deposited into an account held at Fidelity Investments, account no. Tl03225994 in the 
name of the Masazo Trust (the "Fidelity Account"). The Fidelity Account was 
established under the joint control of Tosh and Sok, as Trustees of the Masazo Trust. 
(Trial Exhibit 81; addendum Exhibit W) (R. 1172-1171,135). 
On January 30, 1995, the Farmington Lot was purchased by the Partnership for 
$57,000. (Trial Exhibits 26 and 71; addendum Exhibits X and Y) (R. 1171, f36). 
When replacement properties could not be found by all the partners, it was 
proposed that Tosh, Sok and the Masazo Trust contribute funds to complete the purchase 
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of the Medical Clinic and when refinancing was subsequently acquired, the funds would 
be released to be placed in other projects. On July 6, 1995, the Medical Clinic was 
purchased for the total purchase price of $1,610,415. The following parties contributed to 
the purchase of the Medical Clinic in the following amounts: 
The Limited Partnership, as to 69.48% $1,118,628.00 
The Masazo Trust, as to 3% $48,300.00 
Sok Shiba, as to 13.76% $221,536.00 
Tosh Shiba, as to 13.76% $221,536.00 
(Trial Exhibit 36; addendum Exhibit Z) (R. 1171, Tf38). 
On July 6, 1995, a Warranty Deed was delivered by the seller of the Medical 
Clinic, as Grantor, conveying and warranting title in the Medical Clinic to the following: 
Shiba Family Farms, as to an undivided 69.48% interest; and 
Masakazu Shiba and Toshiro Shiba, Trustees, as to an undivided 3% interest; and 
Masakazu Shiba, as to an undivided 13.76% interest, and 
Toshiro Shiba, as to an undivided 13.76% interest. 
(Trial Exhibit 72; addendum Exhibit AA) (R. 1171-1170,1J39). The foregoing 
percentages of ownership in the Medical Clinic were calculated by Mr. Jeffs, as directed 
and assisted by the general partners, Sok and Tosh. (R. 1170, f40). 
On November 21, 1995, refinancing for the Medical Clinic was accomplished with 
the closing of a loan from Berkshire Life Insurance Company in the amount of $900,000 
(the "Berkshire Loan"), and the execution of a non-recourse note in that amount by the 
Partnership, the Masazo Trust, Sok and Tosh as obligors. (Trial Exhibits 74, 40; 
addendum Exhibits BB and CC) (R. 1170, ^ 41). The proceeds of the Berkshire Loan 
were deposited into an account or accounts owned by the Partnership and managed under 
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the direction of Tosh, as a general partner. The proceeds of the Berkshire Loan were 
invested in identified stocks and financial instruments and accounts in the name of the 
Partnership, where they remain. (R. 1170,^42). Following its purchase, the Medical 
Clinic was managed by Sok, as a general partner. (R. 1169,1J46) 
On March 14, 1996, acting on the request of Sok, attorney David Jeffs wrote to 
both Sok and Tosh to transmit a draft Management Agreement in an attempt "to resolve 
many of the issues which we have previously discussed about the management of the two 
properties, the allocation of income and the ultimate distribution of the properties." (Trial 
Exhibit 87; addendum Exhibit DD). The proposed Management Agreement was rejected 
by Tosh and no Management Agreement was ever entered into. (R. 1169,1}47). 
At all times following the purchase of the Medical Clinic, the tax returns of the 
Partnership showed that the Partnership treated its interest in the Medical Clinic as an 
asset of the Partnership in the same capital percentage as the farm land had been held 
before the sale. (See e.g., Trial Exhibits 44, 80, 94, 97, 99; addendum Exhibits EE - II) 
(R. 1169,1J48). 
Upon the advice of accountants, for tax years 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999, Tosh 
attempted to make reconciliations or re-accountings of partnership income according to 
the pre-allocations contemplated in the Family Agreement. The reconciliations for tax 
years 1996 and 1999 were not used, but for tax years 1997 and 1998 partners made 
payments to one another which they identified as "gifts" in order to specifically attribute 
expenses of operation, profit or loss from the allocated properties to the partners who had 
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located those properties. The "gifts" were made with the full knowledge of all partners 
that they were not truly gifts but were attempts to reallocate or adjust the profit and loss 
of the Partnership based on the pre-allocation of exchange property. (Trial Exhibit 29; 
addendum Exhibit JJ) (R. 1169, f49). 
At some point in this process, Tosh was advised that these "backroom" re-
computations and "gifts" were illegal in that they violated both the still unamended LP 
Agreement and the law related to Section 1031 exchanges. As a result, he discontinued 
the preparation of reconciliations, and no more "gifts" were exchanged by the partners 
after tax year 1998. (R. 1168, ^ 50). 
In October 1998, Masazo passed away, rendering the Masazo Trust incapable of 
further amendment. (R. 1168, f51). 
Since at least December 1997 through the present date, Tosh and Sok have been 
unable to cooperate on partnership matters and business, including the preparation of tax 
returns for the Partnership. (See e.g., correspondence between Tosh and Sok in Trial 
Exhibits 96, 112, 113, 114, 115, 130, 132; addendum Exhibits KK - QQ) (R. 1168, f52). 
On January 6, 2000, Tosh wrote a letter to attorney David Jeffs responding to Mr. Jeffs 
letter of March 14, 1996 regarding the proposed Management Agreement. Tosh 
proposed a revised Management Agreement. (Trial Exhibit 23; addendum Exhibit RR) 
(R. 1168, f 53). On February 4, 2000, Mr. Jeffs wrote to Tosh advising that Sok had 
rejected the Management Agreement proposed by Tosh, and enclosing a proposed 
Liquidation, Exchange and Distribution Agreement ("Liquidation Agreement"). (Trial 
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Exhibit 24; addendum Exhibit SS). Tosh rejected the proposed Liquidation Agreement. 
(R. 1168,f54). 
On September 1, 2000, the Partnership, as Grantor, conveyed the Farmington Lot 
to Ron and Nats, by Warranty Deed. (Trial Exhibit 30; addendum Exhibit TT, R. 1168, 
H55). 
All property except for the lot conveyed to Ron and Nats, real and personal, and all 
financial accounts, have been retained in the name and title of the Partnership. (R. 1167, 
1156). 
As general partner of the Partnership, Sok has managed the Medical Clinic. 
During the course of such management, Sok has withdrawn for his personal use funds 
from the rental income of the Medical Clinic for which accounting has not been made to 
the Partnership. (Tr. 497). As general partner of the Partnership, Tosh has borrowed 
funds from the investment accounts of the Partnership, for which he has executed 
promissory notes and paid interest to the Partnership in accordance with the provisions set 
forth in the LP Agreement. (R. 1167, |57). 
Prior to the Trial of this action, no dissolution of the Partnership has occurred, and 
there has been no winding up of Partnership affairs. Amendments to the Partnership are 
specifically allowed under section 15.8 of the Partnership Agreement upon approval of 
more than 51% ownership interest of the partners. All of the partners representing 100% 
of the ownership interest executed the 1994 agreement. (R. 1167, ffi[59-60). 
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The 1994 Family Agreement (Trial Exhibit 13) clearly and unambiguously 
expresses that all the partners agreed to be governed by four documents including the No 
Change Pledge; the Exchanging Properties document; the Pre-Allocation Plans; and, the 
Present Ownership Schedule. (R. 1167, TJ61). 
IV. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly concluded that Tosh Shiba is entitled to a distribution of 
50% of the funds held in the Fidelity Account representing his interest in the proceeds 
from the sale of Masazo's home and acreage because Tosh never conveyed his interest to 
the Trust or the Partnership and Masazo had no legal ability to transfer Tosh's interest to 
his trust. Further, the trial court correctly concluded that the Family Agreement failed to 
modify distribution of the Partnership assets upon dissolution of the Partnership and that 
distribution of the assets must be effectuated as previously established in the LP 
Agreement. 
Further, as Appellants have failed to argue the issues as presented, have not 
properly preserved or raised the issue of ambiguity, have improperly present extrinsic 
evidence of intent and have failed to marshal the evidence, this Court should adopt the 
trial court's findings and conclusions, affirming the same on appeal. 
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V. ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT TOSH DID NOT 
RELINQUISH TITLE TO AN UNDIVIDED ONE HALF INTEREST IN 
THE MASAZO HOME AND ACREAGE AND IS, THEREFORE, 
ENTITLED TO A DISTRIBUTION OF 50% OF THE FUNDS HELD IN 
THE FIDELITY ACCOUNT FROM THE SALE OF MASAZO'S HOME. 
As noted above, from a reading of Appellants' issue no. 1, it is difficult to 
understand the precise legal issue Appellants seek to have reviewed. However, a reading 
of Appellants' argument makes clear that Appellants seek to overturn the trial court's 
conclusion and order that the funds deposited in the Fidelity account belong to Tosh and 
Sok in equal shares. Appellants contend that in the Family Agreement, specifically the 
Present Ownership Schedule, Tosh and the Masazo Trust agreed to convey their jointly 
held property (i.e., Masazo's home) and distribute all of the proceeds from the sale of the 
home to Sok. (Appellants' Brief at 16-18). 
Appellants' argument fails for several reasons. First, Appellants have completely 
failed to demonstrate how the Present Ownership Schedule constitutes an agreement for 
Tosh to convey to Sok all of his interest in the Masazo residence. The schedule makes no 
such statement and, although signed, does not contain a sufficient declaration of 
contractual intent or a sufficient description of property to support a legal conclusion that 
Tosh has conveyed his titled interest in a specific property to Sok. "If the property to be 
conveyed under a land sales contract is not described by the agreement with certainty, 
specific performance of the agreement may not be required." Barnard v. Barnard, 700 
P.2d 1113, 1114 (Utah 1985). To the contrary, the Present Ownership Schedule sets forth 
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a number of items of real and personal property and what appears to be corresponding 
shares attached to each. The only reference to property in the Present Ownership 
Schedule which could be the Masazo home is the following: "Res. #1 Masazo Shiba Mar. 
& Fam. Trust." However, that reference is imprecise, does not include any legal 
description of property and fails to reference Tosh's undisputed title to an undivided 50% 
interest. Consequently, the Masazo home and related real property is not described 
specifically or sufficiently, the shares are internally inconsistent from a mathematical 
analysis, the calculations predate and presuppose a sales transaction (i.e., specific 
amounts) that never occurred, and the calculations are not referenced in any of the text of 
the Family Agreement in such a way as to support a finding or legal conclusion that the 
parties had reached an agreement to convey property in the manner argued by Appellants. 
Indeed, and to the contrary, the No Change Pledge (Trial Exhibit 14, Appellants' 
Exhibit 1) references the Present Ownership Schedule, but does so in language which 
unmistakably refutes Appellants' contention. At page one of the No Change Pledge, 
Masazo provides that while the Present Ownership Schedule may be used by his children 
to calculate a "pre-allocated amount", he makes clear that the "pre-allocated amount and 
its earnings shall remain my property until such time of distribution from my estate," thus 
dispelling any argument that a pre-distribution occurred. (Emphasis added). He 
concludes the No Change Pledge by stating: "I will cooperate by amending my trust to 
facilitate exchanging of properties outlined in the document titled 'Exchanging Properties 
From Farm Sale presented in family meeting on December 3, 1994.'" (Trial Exhibit 14, 
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Appellants' Exhibit 1). From the foregoing, it is clear that Masazo was discussing only 
his property, and as to his property, Masazo decided to retain all ownership of the same 
until it was distributed from his estate. Further, although he made clear any exchange of 
properties would require modification of his trust and that he would cooperate in 
amending it, the trust was never modified accordingly. Therefore, as to Tosh Shiba's 
property, the No Change Pledge had no force or effect. It was applicable only to 
Masazo's property held in trust. 
It appears that Masazo may have been operating under a mistaken assumption that 
his trust owned 100% of his home, or that he had simply forgotten that Tosh was the titled 
holder of 50% of the home but, either way, Masazo had no legal ability to convey 
property owned by Tosh. The trial court correctly ruled on this point. 
Second, nothing in the language of the Family Agreement, including the Present 
Ownership Schedule, contains any statement of agreement by Tosh to convey the 
property. Further, there is no statement from which the existence of consideration to 
support a conveyance by Tosh can by determined or implied. "Consideration is an 'act or 
promise, bargained for and given in exchange for a promise. . . . " Resource Management 
Co. v. Weston Ranch 706 P.2d, 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985). "Where consideration is 
lacking, there can be no contract." General Ins. Co. Of America, v. Carnicero Dynasty 
Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1976). In the absence or lack of consideration stated or 
implied in any of the Family Agreement documents, there can be no contract to bind Tosh 
to a conveyance of his interest in Masazo's home and acreage. What is clear in the trial 
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record is that no deed or contract exists for the purchase and sale, or the conveyance by 
gift, of Tosh's interest in Masazo's home. The trial court recognized the absence of such 
an agreement by concluding that Tosh retained his interest. 
Nevertheless, Appellants argue that the Present Ownership schedule modifies the 
agreement of the parties regarding their individual interests in the 30 acre parcel. 
Appellants concede that the trial court concluded the four documents comprising the 
Family Agreement were agreed upon by the parties and are "valid amendments to both 
the trust and the [LP Agreement]" but Appellants fail to also point out that the trial court 
found that such documents "fail to explicitly modify distribution of the replacement 
properties upon dissolution of the partnership or termination of the trust." (R. 1164, 
Finally, as discussed below, Appellants fail to direct this Court to any 
detemiinative provisions of either the Masazo Trust or the LP Agreement which provide 
for distribution of Tosh's interest in the proceeds of the sale of the residences. In light of 
the lack of any definitive language in the Family Agreement modifying the Masazo Trust 
or the LP Agreement, and the absence of language in the Trust and LP Agreement to 
provide for conveyance of Tosh's property, the Court properly held that while the Pre-
allocation Plans, together with the Present Ownership Schedule were calculations to assist 
in the selection of and allocation of replacement properties, they do not affect the ultimate 
plan for distribution of Trust and Partnership properties. As to Tosh's interest in the 
Masazo home, the Court reviewed the plain evidence and concluded that Tosh retained 
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legal title to half the property until he sold his share to the purchaser of the Farm, and his 
interest could not be disturbed or amended by the Family Agreement. 
Pursuant to the Masazo Trust, Masazo directed that the Trust's Vi share in the 30 
acre parcel was to be distributed under three separate provisions of the Trust. Under 
Section 5d(6)(i), the interest of the Masazo Trust in 1.49 acres "more or less"ofthe 30 
acre parcel where Tosh's home was located was to be distributed to Tosh. Since Tosh 
already owned the other undivided Vi of the 1.49 acres and home, as a beneficiary of the 
Trust, he became the 100% owner of the home and parcel on which it sits. (Masazo 
Trust, Exhibit 2, p. 7). Under Section 5d(6)(ii), as amended, the Vi undivided interest of 
the Masazo Trust in 1.372 acres of real property where Masazo and Riye's primary 
residence was located was to be distributed to Sok. (Masazo Trust, Second Amendment, 
Exhibit 4). At the distribution of the Trust, that would result in Sok owning an undivided 
Vi interest in the Masazo home and 1.372 acres, and Tosh owning an undivided lA interest 
in the home and 1.372 acres (due to the fact that Tosh's interest was never conveyed nor 
relinquished). Under Section 5d(6)(iii), the remaining portion of the Masazo Trust's Vi 
share of the 30 acre parcel was to be distributed in equal shares to Tosh and Sok. 
(Masazo Trust, Exhibit 2, p. 8). 
At the time the farm was sold in 1995, the 30 acre parcel was sold with it. (R. 
1172, ^34). All of the proceeds of the sale of Masazo's home and the 1.372 acres that it 
sits on were deposited into an account known as the Fidelity Account, which is still 
owned by the Masazo Trust. (R. 1172-1171, p 5 ) . Appellants fail to point out that not 
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only does Tosh, by virtue of the 1959 Warranty Deed (Exhibit 60), own a half interest in 
proceeds of the sale of Masazo's residence, but the Masazo Trust also provides that Tosh 
is to receive the Masazo Trust's share in Tosh's residence, therefore making Tosh owner 
of 100%) of the proceeds resulting from the sale of his residence and 50% of the proceeds 
resulting from the sale of Masazo's residence. Therefore, the trial court properly 
concluded Tosh was entitled to 50% of the Fidelity Account. (R. 1163, ^  14). 
In this case the merger doctrine supports the trial court's determination. The Utah 
Supreme Court has recognized that the merger doctrine serves the purpose of 
"preserving] the integrity of the final document of conveyance and encouraging] the 
diligence of the parties." Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 795 (Utah 1986). In accord with 
this principle is the basic premise that 
ordinarily, a final contract does represent the final meeting 
of the minds, and in it are merged all the terms expressing 
the final intentions of the parties and any augmentations. If 
there are inconsistencies between the terms of the 
preliminary and final contracts, those of the latter will 
ordinarily govern. 
Embassy Group, Inc. v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Ut.Ct.App. 1993); Quoting 
Mawhinney v. Jensen, 120 Utah 142, 150, 232 P.2d 769, 774 (1951). "Furthermore, the 
supreme court has recognized that a deed is tantamount to a final real estate contract... 
" Id. at 1371; Quoting Espinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 346, 348 (Utah 1979). 
Here, Tosh's 50% interest (as established by the Warranty Deed) in Masazo's 
home never was conveyed into the Masazo Trust and therefore the parties couldn't have 
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agreed to a certain distribution because the Trust never owned the property. There is no 
document that ever conveys Tosh's interest into the Masazo Trust. As such, the court 
cannot distribute property pursuant to the Masazo Trust that the Trust does not own. 
The parties agreed that Masazo's home, in which Tosh owned a Vi interest as 
tenant in common (Exhibit 60, R. 1178), was valued at $150,000.00 (R. 1084-1083). 
Subsequently, the proceeds from the sale of the home were placed in the Fidelity Account 
(R. 1172, 1171). On December 31, 1985, Masazo conveyed, by quit claim deed, his 
interest in the property including the 30 acre parcel on which his home stood. (Exhibit 
62, R. 1178). However, Tosh did not convey any of his interest in the 30 acre parcel or in 
Masazo's home. (R. 1178). 
Therefore, pursuant to Tosh's ownership under the 1959 Warranty Deed and the 
determinative provisions of the Masazo Trust, Tosh is entitled to one half of the proceeds 
deposited into the Fidelity Account and one half of any interest accrued thereon. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE FAMILY 
AGREEMENT FAILED TO MODIFY DISTRIBUTION OF THE 
PARTNERSHIP ASSETS UPON DISSOLUTION OF THE PARTNERSHIP. 
Notwithstanding Appellants' improper arguments regarding ambiguity of the 
Family Agreement, there has never been an effective amendment regarding modification 
of distribution percentages pursuant to the LP Agreement. (R. 1164, fflf 14-15). The trial 
court concluded that amendments to the LP Agreement were specifically allowed under 
section 15.8 of the partnership agreement (Exhibit 8) upon approval of more than 51% 
ownership interest of the partners. Specifically, section 15.8 states, in part, the following: 
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Amendments. If the General Partners shall propose in writing to the 
Limited Partners the adoption of an amendment to this agreement, and if, 
within thirty (30) days of the giving of a notice containing such proposal, 
more than fifty-one percent (51%) in ownership interest of the partners, 
including the General Partners, shall have given their written consent 
thereto, then each Limited Partners, shall, if requested, promptly execute or 
cause to be executed one or more amendments to this agreement and 
certificates of the partnership as may be required to reflect such 
amendments under the laws of the jurisdictions in which the partnership 
does business at such time. 
Here, there has been no such amendment. The trial court determined in its 
Memorandum Decision that by reading the documents of the Family Agreement in 
conjunction with one another: 
it is clear that all agreed that both the trust and the SF partnership 
agreement would allow the selection and management of replacement 
properties to be assigned to each of the partners to a degree equal to their 
percentage of ownership but that ultimate ownership and, critical for this 
discussion, distribution upon dissolution of the partnership would be as 
previously established. The documents .. . fail to explicitly modify 
distribution of the replacement properties upon dissolution of the 
partnership or termination of the trust. 
(R.1086-1085). 
The trial court also found that the partners were aware of the LP Agreement and 
sought advice from professionals regarding implementation of certain financial strategies. 
(R. 1175, f22). As such, the partners were aware that if they intended to modify or alter 
the ownership shares of the partners they would have to comply with the LP Agreement 
to effectuate such an amendment. (R. 1173, p0) . However, this did not happen. Rather, 
the evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that there was no amendment and that 
the partners implemented the 1031 exchange for the purpose of selecting and managing 
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replacement properties, assigned to each partner to a degree equal to their percentage of 
ownership in the Partnership, for management and diversification purposes only, but that 
ultimate ownership and distribution of the Partnership would be as set forth in the 
unamended LP Agreement. ( R. 1165-64, ffiflO-16). 
Further, a limited partnership is a creature of statute and courts do not have 
authority to disregard the legal structure and manner in which a limited partnership may 
be amended. The trial court recognized this legal principle when it stated: ". . . the Court 
concludes that it does not have equitable power to vary or ignore the terms and provisions 
of the LP Agreement to alter the ownership shares of the partners therein." (R. 1065, 
f 11). In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court based its conclusion on Utah Code § 
48-2a-804, and stated: 
Utah Code § 48-2a-804 requires that upon winding up of a limited 
partnership, the assets shall be distributed in accordance with the 
partnership agreement after accounting for interim distributions and 
withdrawals. 
(R. 1065-1064). Notably, Appellants do not challenge the trial court's conclusion that it 
does not have equitable power to vary or ignore the LP Agreement. 
Therefore, as limited partnerships are created by statute, and as the LP Agreement 
is specific as to how the partners are to effectuate an amendment of the same, the trial 
court's ruling is correct that it does not have the authority to ignore or vary the terms of 
the LP Agreement to alter ownership percentages of the partners and that the Family 
Agreement does not modify the distribution method of the LP Agreement. As such, there 
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has never been an effective amendment altering or modifying the distribution percentages 
of the LP Agreement. 
Moreover, and contrary to Appellants' argument that the parties intended the 
Family Agreement to amend the LP Agreement, the documentary evidence is clear that 
the parties intended that the Partnership retain ownership of all replacement properties 
and that upon dissolution of the Partnership, distribution of the assets would be as 
previously established in the LP Agreement. (R. 1069, 1064). 
1. Appellants Misconstrue the Trial Court's Findings Regarding Payment 
of Interest for Purchase of the Medical Clinic. 
Appellants have misconstrued a finding of fact of the trial court and have failed to 
marshal the evidence and clarify such finding in the attempt to have this court believe that 
the parties' intent was something other than what the evidence demonstrates. In the trial 
court's Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 43, the court 
found: "Interest for the use of the money for those months was charged to and paid by 
Masakazu." (R. 1170). However, there was never a finding that Sok used his personal 
funds to pay this interest. There also has never been a finding by the trial court that the 
Partnership did not make final payment on the accrued interest for the use of the 
aforementioned monies. Despite the absence of such a finding, Appellants have 
nevertheless asserted that the interest for the use of this money was paid by Sok 
personally. (Appellants' Brief at 29). This simply is not the case and is not supported by 
the record. 
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The payment referenced by the trial court in finding no. 43 (R. 1170) was 
$31,264.59. This amount was calculated in the document entitled "Distribution of Interim 
Amounts Before Loan Funding Under Pre-Allocated Basis." (See Exhibit UU to 
Appendix). On that document, payment of the stated sum is referenced as having been 
made by check no. 311 on November 20, 1995. The corresponding check is drawn on the 
account of Shiba Family Farms - the Partnership - at Zions Bank. (See Exhibit VV to 
Appendix). This clearly demonstrates that while Sok wrote the check, it was paid from 
Partnership funds, not Sok's personal funds. 
Though marked for use as exhibits at trial, the foregoing documents were not 
introduced by either party. However, Appellees believe under the circumstances of this 
argument, where Appellant wrongly implies from the Court's finding that Sok paid the 
interest the factual assertion that Sok actually paid the interest from his personal funds, it 
is appropriate to provide copies of records showing that Sok paid the interest from 
partnership funds. At a minimum, Appellees have demonstrated that it is not proper for 
Sok to draw the inference from the trial court's findings that payment of such interest was 
made from Sok's personal funds. 
Therefore, as Appellants' argument is based, in part, on the theory that the parties 
used personal funds to pay the other partners for use of the partnership funds, and as this 
scenario is not a true representation, Appellants' argument must fail. The trial court 
determined that the properties and assets of the Partnership remain the property of the 
Partnership until such time of dissolution. (R. 1086-1085). 
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Therefore, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed that the Family Agreements, 
as a matter of law, failed to modify the LP Agreement with respect to the distribution of 
the replacement properties upon dissolution of the Partnership. 
C APPELLANTS FAIL TO ARGUE THE ISSUES AS PRESENTED, HAVE 
NOT PROPERLY RAISED OR PRESERVED THE ISSUE OF 
AMBIGUITY, IMPROPERLY PRESENT EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF 
INTENT AND FAIL TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
1. As Appellants Have Failed to Properly Raise the Issue of Ambiguity, 
They Should be Barred from Arguing Such on Appeal and any Citation 
to Extrinsic Evidence of Intent is Inappropriate and Should not be 
Considered. 
A review of Appellants' Brief shows that regardless of how they characterize the 
issues, this is not an appeal of alleged legal error by the trial court. Indeed, there is 
almost no citation to legal authority in the brief, and no attempt to demonstrate that the 
trial court erred in its application of law to the facts. Instead, Appellants argue that the 
Family Agreement documents at issue in this case are ambiguous and unclear, and focus 
their argument on an analysis of selective evidence to show that the court committed 
"legal error" in concluding that the LP Agreement required distribution of the assets of 
the Partnership in accordance with the capital ownership of each partner. 
Although it is difficult to identify the Appellants' argument from their presentation 
of the issues,1 a review of Appellants' Brief shows that the argument as to issue no. 2 is 
almost exclusively focused on the argument that the trial court erred in not interpreting 
1
 For this reason, the Appellees have challenged the statement of issues and set forth the 
reasons for their dissatisfaction with the statement of issues presented by Appellant. See infra 
pp. 1-5. 
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the Family Agreement to be ambiguous with respect to the distribution of the replacement 
properties at dissolution of the Partnership, and in failing to apply the Family Agreement 
to distribute the property of the Partnership according to certain "pre-allocations" of 
property for management within the Partnership. In making this argument, Appellants 
contend that the trial court should have considered extrinsic evidence of the parties' 
intent. (Appellants' Brief at 18-22). However, Appellants have failed to raise and 
preserve the issue of ambiguity before this Court. Appellants never raised at trial, in their 
docketing statement, or in their statement of issues presented, the question of whether the 
trial court erred in failing to find, as a matter of law, that the Family Agreement was 
ambiguous thus requiring examination of extrinsic evidence in order to amend the LP 
Agreement on the question of distribution. 
Rather, the Appellants specifically argued to the trial court that the Family 
Agreement was clear and unambiguous and constituted an amendment or modification of 
the LP Agreement with respect to distribution of the replacement properties. (Tr. 761-
68). The Court agreed in part that the Family Agreement "unambiguously expresses that 
all the partners agreed to be governed by [the] four documents [comprising the Family 
Agreement]." (R. 1165, ^ [8). But the trial court further concluded, as a matter of law, that 
pursuant to the No Change Pledge (Exhibit 14), "Masazo intended to transfer only the 
ability to select and manage the particular replacement assets to the selecting partners 
consistent with his goal to provide tax protection and diversification of control and 
management over Limited Partnership assets." (R. 1164, ^|12). The trial court also 
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concluded that the No Change Pledge "was an effective amendment to the Trust but that 
the intent of such amendment was not to remove the designated replacement properties, 
including the Medical Clinic, from [Masazo's] overall estate but to temporarily delegate 
selection and management of replacement assets upon the sale of the farm land, and that 
such properties would remain in his estate until his death when they would be distributed 
in accordance with the terms of the Masazo Trust." (R. 1164, ^[13). 
In summary of the foregoing conclusions, the trial court concluded that when read 
together, the documents comprising the Family Agreement clearly provide that all the 
family members agreed that "ultimate ownership and distribution upon dissolution of the 
partnership would be as previously established." (R. 1164, ^[14). The trial court 
concluded as a matter of law that the Family Agreement constituted a valid amendment to 
both the Masazo Trust and the Partnership but they failed to explicitly modify distribution 
of the replacement properties upon dissolution of the Partnership or termination of the 
Trust. (R. 1164, |15). Therefore, the trial court concluded that 
all assets of the Limited Partnership, including the Medical Clinic, 
investment and cash accounts, water rights, and the funds invested from the 
Berkshire Loan, must be distributed to the partners in accordance with their 
respective capital ownership, after taking into account the effect of the 
Masazo Trust distribution. (R. 1163,1(16) 
In order to challenge the correctness of the trial court's legal conclusions as to the 
interpretation of the contracts at issue in this case, i.e., the Family Agreement, the Masazo 
Trust and the LP Agreement, Appellants must demonstrate that the trial court improperly 
interpreted and applied specific language in such contractual documents from the four 
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corners of the documents. On this appeal (at least as to issue no. 2)2, however, Appellants 
have for the first time contended that the Family Agreement documents are ambiguous 
and unclear and that resort to an examination of extrinsic facts is necessary in order to 
determine the intent of the parties with respect to such documents. It is improper to raise 
this issue for the first time on appeal. 
Appellants have not properly preserved the legal question of whether the trial court 
erred in holding that the Family Agreement is clear and unambiguous. It is well 
established that courts will not consider matters raised for the first time on appeal. Wade 
v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah App. 1994). Utah courts generally look at three factors 
when determining whether a party properly preserved an issue for appeal: "(1) the issue 
must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a 
party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Brookside Mobile 
Home Park, LTD. v. Peebles, 48 P.3d 968, 972 (Utah 2002) as cited from Badger v. 
Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 
358, 361 (Utah App. 1993) (for an issue to be properly preserved for appellate review, it 
must be raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it). 
2
 It appears that Appellants take an inconsistent view as to whether the Family 
Agreement is ambiguous or not, depending upon the issue raised. For example, in issue no. 1, 
Appellants contend that the parties entered into a "clear and unambiguous written agreement" to 
sell the farm and related property (including the 30 acre parcel) and distribute the proceeds in a 
specific amount to each co-tenant), but then, when making their argument as to issue no. 2, 
Appellants contend that the Family Agreement is ambiguous and unclear. 
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Here, counsel for Appellees has been unable to locate any instance in the trial 
court record where the Appellants raised the issue of ambiguity of the Family Agreement 
with respect to amending the distribution percentages of the partners upon dissolution of 
the Partnership. Rather, and contrary to Appellants' current position, at the trial of this 
matter Appellants argued that the court should find the Family Agreement sufficient to 
modify the LP Agreement so as to provide for a distribution of the replacement 
properties. (Tr. 761-68). Alternatively, Appellants argued that if the trial court did not 
find the Family Agreement sufficient to modify the LP Agreement, the court should find 
that the LP Agreement could be modified by conduct of the parties. {Id.) Appellants' 
arguments at trial in no way raised the issue that the Family Agreement is ambiguous. 
Further, the trial court never addressed the issue of ambiguity. As such, the Appellants 
have failed to raise this issue and any attempt to do so now for the first time on appeal 
should be barred. 
Moreover, the Appellants' arguments do not track or follow their Docketing 
Statement and the Statement of Issues Presented. Rather, Appellants' first issue for 
appeal refers to the "clear and unambiguous written agreement", and the second issue 
states that although the court found the Family Agreement to be unambiguous, the court 
nonetheless erred by finding that the Family Agreement did not modify distribution of the 
replacement properties upon dissolution of the Partnership. (Appellants' Brief at 3). 
However, Appellants' Statement of the Issues makes no mention nor in any way refers to 
Appellants' argument that the court erred by not finding the Family Agreement to be 
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ambiguous. Despite the failure to present the issue of ambiguity, Appellants make 
ambiguity the central focus of their argument on appeal. 
As additional proof that the Appellants have not properly raised the issue of 
ambiguity, Appellants cite no law with respect to proper review of a trial court's finding 
that a contract is unambiguous; nor is there any discussion or analysis demonstrating that 
the trial court improperly concluded that the Family Agreement failed to explicitly 
modify distribution of the Partnership assets. Rather, the only discussion and citation to 
law in Appellants' brief refers to how a court should view extrinsic evidence of an 
ambiguous contract. The Appellants then proceed to a discussion of extrinsic evidence 
without ever demonstrating or even alleging that the court erred in not finding the Family 
Agreements to be ambiguous. 
Importantly, there has been no legal conclusion that the Family Agreements, the 
Masazo Trust or the LP Agreement are ambiguous. The trial court was never presented 
with the issue of ambiguity with respect to the Family Agreement and distribution of 
replacement properties. Therefore, without having challenged the trial court's legal 
conclusion that the Family Agreement is not ambiguous, the Appellants cannot resort to 
extrinsic evidence. 
2. As Appellants' First and Second Issues Challenge the Trial Court's 
Findings and Conclusions - that the Family Agreement Failed to 
Expressly Modify Distribution of the Limited Partnership - and as the 
Challenge is Fact Intensive, the Appellants Have Failed in Their Duty 
to Marshal the Evidence in Support. 
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Utah courts hold that even where a party purports to challenge only the trial court's 
legal ruling, if a determination of the correctness of the court's application of a legal 
standard is fact intensive, the party has a duty to marshal the evidence. A party cannot 
dodge this duty by attempting to frame the issues as legal ones. United Park City Mines 
Co., v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Founds, 140 P.3d 1200, 1206 (Utah 2006); See 
also Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 1184-1185 (Utah 2004). 
The trial court carefully analyzed the Family Agreement, and each document 
comprising the same, and made numerous factual findings upon which it based its ruling 
that the Family Agreement failed to modify the LP Agreement with respect to distribution 
of the replacement properties. (See Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
ffif 23- 31, 37, 46, 48, 51, 56, 59 -61; R. 1174-1167). As noted above, none of these 
findings referenced the presence of ambiguity in the documents. Each of these findings 
were incorporated into the trial court's conclusions that the Family Agreement did not 
modify the LP Agreement's provisions regarding distribution of the property of the 
Partnership. Therefore, a party challenging the trial court's legal conclusions regarding 
whether the Family Agreement modified the LP Agreement as to distribution must also 
challenge the mixed questions of law and fact present in such conclusions. Such an 
appellant has a duty to marshal the evidence to support its challenge of facts. 
In order to properly marshal the evidence, a party is required to gather all the 
evidence that supports the court's finding and: 
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temporarily remove [their] own prejudices and fully embrace the 
adversary's position; [they] mut play the devil's advocate. In so doing, 
appellants must present the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial 
court and not attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their 
case . . . In sum, to properly marshal the evidence the challenging party 
must demonstrate how the court found the facts from the evidence and then 
explain why those findings contradict the clear weight of the evidence. 
United Park City Mines Co. 140 P.3d at 1207, quoting Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 
1184-1185 (Utah 2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Here, Appellants purport to challenge the trial court's legal ruling that the Family 
Agreement does not modify distribution of the replacement properties upon dissolution of 
the Partnership or termination of the Masazo Trust. (Appellants' Brief at 22). However, 
instead of challenging that ruling on a review of the language contained within the four 
corners of the documents themselves, Appellants resort to a discussion of the parties' 
subsequent actions and extrinsic evidence to support their argument. Examples of 
Appellants' arguments include the following: 
The second issue presented in this appeal is the interpretation of the parties' 
intent in signing several documents in an effort to amend the limited 
partnership agreement. (Appellants' Brief at 19) (emphasis added). 
Although it is clear that the partners intended to modify their partnership 
agreement, the language of the Family Agreement is ambiguous and 
uncertain as to the intent of the parties regarding final distribution of the 
partnership assets. {Id. at 22) (emphasis added). 
There is uncertainty and ambiguity as to such terms as "pre-allocation", 
"individualize" and ownership of the "separate properties" without further 
explanation of how the property will be distributed or disposed of. {Id. at 
23) (emphasis added). 
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The precise purpose and intent of the parties regarding its impact on the 
distribution of the partnership assets upon termination are not as clearly 
stated. (Id.) (emphasis added). 
As demonstrated by the foregoing statements, Appellants' entire argument regarding 
their second issue for appeal, consists of a presentation of extrinsic evidence regarding 
intent and subsequent actions. (See Appellants' Brief at 21-31). As such, the Appellants 
have a duty to marshal all the evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the Family 
Agreement failed to modify distribution of the replacement properties out of the 
Partnership. (United Park City Mines Co. 140 P.3d at 1206). Mere recitation of selective 
extrinsic facts of intent and subsequent actions in support of argument does not fulfil a 
party's marshaling burden. Id. at 1207. 
Here, the Appellants have failed to marshal the evidence. Appellants' Brief is 
completely devoid of any recitation of all the evidence on which the trial court based its 
finding, any discussion and analysis regarding viewing such evidence in a light most 
favorable to Appellees, and any discussion that despite all the evidence in support, the 
trial court's finding contradicts the clear weight of the evidence. (Id.). Indeed, 
Appellants ignore key evidence in the record, key findings of fact made by the trial court, 
and fail completely to examine the testimony and documentary exhibits admitted in 
support of the trial court's findings. Rather, Appellants simply dive into a discussion of 
selective extrinsic evidence of intent and subsequent actions without properly challenging 
and marshaling the evidence in support of the court's finding. 
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As such, this court should affirm the trial court's ruling that the Family Agreement 
fails to modify the LP Agreement with respect to distribution of the Partnership assets at 
dissolution. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellees respectfully request that this Court affirm the 
trial court's ruling that (1) Tosh is entitled to one half interest in the Fidelity Account, 
representing his share of the proceeds and accrued interest resulting from the sale of 
Masazo's home, and (2) the Family Agreement failed to modify the LP Agreement as to 
distribution of the Partnership's assets upon dissolution. Therefore the Partnership's 
assets should be distributed in accordance with the terms and provisions contained 
therein. 
DATED this / '^day of October, 2007. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
m A. Schmutz 
Andrew V. Wright 
Attorneys for Appelles 
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